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PREVIEW; Murray v. BEJ Minerals: Digging Up the Truth on 
Whether the Possessory Right of Dinosaur Fossils Lie with a Parcel’s 




The Montana Supreme Court will hear oral argument in this matter 
on Thursday, November 7, 2019, at 9:30 a.m., in the Courtroom of the 
Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, 
Montana. Eric B. Wolff will likely appear on behalf of the Appellants. 





The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted rehearing en banc in 
Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, to determine whether dinosaur fossils are 
part of the surface or mineral estate under Montana law.1 Finding state 
law determinative and no controlling precedent, the Ninth Circuit 
certified the question to the Montana Supreme Court. This question asks 
the Court to determine: Whether, under Montana law, dinosaur fossils 
constitute “minerals” for the purpose of a mineral reservation? 
 
 This question presents the Court with the issue of determining 
whether dinosaur fossils are “minerals” for the purpose of a mineral 
reservations in a deed between private parties in Montana. During the 
2019 Legislative Session, the Montana State Legislature passed 
legislation establishing that fossils are not “minerals” for the purpose of a 
mineral rights reservation.2 Here, however, the Court has the opportunity 
to articulate a test that will affect not only the dinosaurs fossils in this 
matter, but also principles of contract interpretation and the relationship 
between the judiciary and the legislature.  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
George Severson previously owned a farm and ranch property 
including both the surface and mineral estate (“the Ranch”) located in 
Garfield County, Montana. George Severson has leased the Ranch to 
Mary Ann and Lige Murray (collectively the “Murrays”) since 1983.3 
From approximately 1991 until 2005, George Severson transferred 
portions of his property interest to his two sons, Jerry and Robert 
(collectively the “Seversons”). The property interest still retained by the 
Seversons has been transferred to BEJ Minerals, LLC, and RTWF, LLC.4 
In 2005, after of the surface and mineral estates were severed, George 
 
* Kylar Clifton, Candidate for J.D. 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of 
Montana. 
1 920 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc). 
2 H.B. 229, 66th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019) (codified as MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-
112). 
3 Murray v. Billings Garfield Land Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1204 (D. Mont. 2016). 
4 Id. at 1205. 
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Severson sold the remainder of his interest to the Murrays.5 Until 2005, 
the Seversons and the Murrays jointly owned and operated the Ranch.6 
Subsequently, the Seversons sold their entire surface estate rights and 
one-third of their mineral estate rights to the Murrays.7 The mineral deed 
executed and recorded by both parties during the sale stated that both 
parties would remain tenants in common to “all right title and interest in 
and to all of the oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and minerals in, on and under, 
and that may be produced” from the Ranch.8 At the time the parties 
executed the sale of the surface estate, neither the Seversons nor the 
Murrays suspected dinosaur fossils existed on the Ranch.9 
 
After the severance and conveyance of the mineral and surface 
estates, the Murrays discovered several valuable dinosaur fossils 
(collectively the “Fossils”) on the Ranch.10 One of the discoveries 
included a pair of interlocked dinosaurs nicknamed “the Dueling 
Dinosaurs.”11 The Dueling Dinosaurs were appraised to have a market 
value of seven to nine million dollars.12 Additionally, the fossilized 
remains of a Tyrannosaurus rex was discovered in 2013 and the Murrays 
have already sold this theropod to a Dutch museum for millions of 
dollars with the proceeds held in escrow pending the resolution of this 
litigation.13 The Murrays claim that they first notified the Seversons of 
the initial discoveries in 200814, however, this fact is disputed. 
 
The Murrays filed a complaint in the Sixteenth Judicial District 
Court of Montana seeking a declaratory judgment that the they are the 
rightful owners of the Fossils under Montana law because fossils are part 
of the surface estate.15 The Seversons removed the case to federal court 
on the basis of diversity and counterclaimed that the Fossils were part of 
the mineral estate.16 The Seversons assert that the Fossils are “minerals” 
under Montana law, and, as such, they are entitled to part of the proceeds 
from the sale of the Fossils.17 
  
The United States District Court for the District of Montana, 
Billings Division, presided over the case and held that dinosaur fossils 
are not “minerals” for the purposes of a mineral reservation under 
Montana law.18 The Seversons appealed the judgement to the Ninth 
Circuit.19 A majority of a three judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed 











14 Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 924 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2019). 
15 Id. 
16 Murray, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1207. 
17 Murray, 924 F.3d at 1073. 
18 Murray, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1212. 
19 Murray, 924 F.3d at 1073. 
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are “minerals.”20 However, this holding by the Ninth Circuit panel is 
non-precedential.21 The Murrays requested a rehearing en banc.22 A 
majority vote of the active non-recused judges of the Ninth Circuit 
granted the request for an en banc hearing23 and stayed proceedings 
pending a determination by the Court whether the Fossils are part of the 
surface or mineral estate for the purposes of a mineral reservation under 
Montana law.24  
 
The Court accepted the certified question on June 4, 2019.25 In 
accordance with the Montana Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court 
may reformulate the question pending full consideration of the issue.26 
Here, the Court may take this opportunity to articulate whether or not 
fossils should be part of the mineral or surface estate of a property 
regardless of what the Montana State Legislature determined last session, 
or the Court may choose to focus on the contractual agreement between 
the two parties and leave the legislative determination untouched. 
 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
 
A. Appellants’ Arguments 
 
The Seversons contend that the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
determining that the Fossils discovered on the Ranch are categorized as 
“minerals.”27 The Seversons assert that due to the value and rareness of 
the Fossils, the Court should determine that the Fossils are “minerals” 
and order that the proceeds from the sale of the Fossils be split according 
to the division of mineral rights under the deed executed by the parties.28 
The Seversons assert that the Court should follow the test announced in 
Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Company29, and refined in 
Hart v. Craig 30, to determine that the Fossils are “minerals” for the 
purpose of a mineral reservation. 
  
In Farley, the Court noted that the term “mineral” has been difficult 
for the courts to define and the statutory definitions available are 
inconsistent.31 The Court held that for a naturally occurring substance to 
be considered a “mineral” for the purpose of a mineral reservation the 
substance must have a particular property giving it special value beyond 
being used for roadbuilding.32 
 
 
20 Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 908 F.3d 437, 448 (9th Cir. 2019).  
21 Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 920 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2019). 
22 Id. 
23 Id.  
24 Murray, 924 F.3d at 1074. 
25 Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 2383604 at *1 (Mont. June 4, 2019) (No. 16-5506). 
26 Mont. R. App. P. 15(6)(a)(iii). 
27 Brief of Appellants, Murray v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 4238239 at *1–2 (Mont. July 2, 
2019) (No. OP 19-0304). 
28 Id. 
29 890 P.2d 377 (Mont. 1995). 
30 216 P.3d 197 (Mont. 2009). 
31 Farley, 890 P.2d at 379–381. 
32 Id. at 380. 
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The Court adopted this test from the Texas Supreme Court decision 
in Heinatz v. Allen.33 In Heinatz, the Texas Supreme Court was tasked 
with determining if limestone was part of the surface or mineral estate 
for a parcel of land.34 The Heinatz, decision held that materials which are 
only of use in road building are not considered minerals.35 The Texas 
Supreme Court held in Heinatz that “substances such as sand, gravel and 
limestone are not minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of 
the word unless they are rare and exceptional in character or possess a 
peculiar property giving them special value.”36 While this language may 
suggest, as the Seversons desire, that substances with rare and 
exceptional value are minerals, the Texas Supreme Court then goes on to 
highlight the production value of substances when they are used to 
“mak[e] glass” or “manufactured into cement.”37 The Texas Supreme 
Court stated that because the limestone was not rare or exceptional in 
value and was closely related to the soil it could not be considered part of 
the mineral estate and was, therefore, part of the surface estate.38 
 
In Farley, the Court determined that even though scoria was used to 
construct roadways that does not make it valuable and exceptional in 
character and therefore is not a mineral.39 In Hart, the Court extended 
their holding in Farley to a dispute over whether sandstone was a part of 
a conveyed mineral reservation.40 The Court relied upon Heinatz and 
ruled that substances such as sandstone are not considered a “mineral” 
unless they are: (1) rare and exceptional in character; or (2) possess a 
peculiar property giving them special value.41 The Court emphasized in 
Hart that sandstone is not considered rare or exceptional simply because 
it can be sold commercially.42 
 
Here, the Seversons urge the Court to focus solely on the Fossils at 
issue here, which would provide the most equitable result.43 The 
Seversons ask the Court to adopt the same interpretation that they did in 
Farley and Hart which provides a substance is a mineral if it: (1) is 
comprised of mineral substances; and (2) is rare and exceptional in 
character or it has a peculiar property giving it special value.44 The 
Seversons contend that because the Fossils are rare and valuable, they 
should be categorized as minerals,” and therefore should be part of the 
mineral estate.45 The Seversons assert that in Farley and subsequently in 
Hart, the Court did not rely on the statutory definitions of the term 
“minerals” and determined that the definitions were of little significance 
 
33 217 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1949). 
34 Id. at 998. 
35 Id. at 997.  
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197, 198 (Mont. 2009). 
41 Id. at 211. 
42 Id. 
43 Appellant Br., supra note 27, at *21–22. 
44 Id. at *12. 
45 Id. at *20. 
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due to the multitude of ways the word mineral can and has been 
defined.46 
 
B. Appellees’ Arguments 
 
The Murrays, contend that the Court should adopt the ruling of the 
district court and conclude that the Fossils are part of the surface estate 
of the Ranch.47 The Murrays argue that if the Court were to conclude that 
fossils are indeed part of the mineral estate relying on the Farley test, 
then other courts will be burdened by having to conduct a case-by-case 
analysis to determine whether fossils disputed in future litigation are rare 
and valuable.48 Further, the Murrays dispute the holding in Farley and 
contend that it did not develop a test that allows for a substance to be 
classified as a mineral if it is exceptionally rare and valuable.49 The 
Murrays contend that in Farley the Court first looked to the statutory 
definitions of the term “mineral” and then assessed whether the 
substance in dispute was of exceptional character.50 The Murrays 
contend that the rare and valuable test articulated in Farley only applies 
if the substance in dispute is not contemplated in the statutory definition 
of the term mineral.51 Since fossils are not defined in any statutory 
definition of the term mineral, the Court cannot move on to the rare and 
valuable analysis of Farley.52 
 
Additionally, the Murrays ask the Court to heed the will of the 
Montana State Legislature which, while this litigation was pending, 
adopted a new provision to the Montana Code providing that fossils are 
not minerals..53 The Murrays additionally argue that since the contract in 
which the mineral and surface estates were conveyed did not explicitly 
contemplate fossils the Court should not construe the mineral reservation 




Defining what constitutes a mineral has not been extensively 
addressed under Montana law, and whether a fossil is a “mineral” has 
never been specifically addressed by the Court. The limited Montana 
case law available, Farley and Hart, which attempted to develop a test 
for the lower courts to apply in classifying minerals were discussed at 
length by both parties. The statutory definitions of the word “mineral” 
under Montana law are contradictory and misleading when employed out 
of context such as with the question currently before the Court.55 The 
Court even acknowledged the contradictory nature of the term in Farley 
 
46 Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 379 (Mont. 1995). 
47 Brief of Appellees, Murrays v. BEJ Minerals, LLC, 2019 WL 4238240 at *1–3 (Mont. July 31, 
2019) (No. OP 19-0304). 
48 Id. at *2.  
49 Id. at *12. 
50 Id. at *11–12. 
51 Id. at *17.  
52 Id. 
53 Id. at *3. 
54 Id. at *10–12. 
55 Id. at *12.  
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and pointed out that under Title 82, Chapter 4 gravel is a “mineral” in 
one provision and not a “mineral” in another.56 
 
The term “mineral” is discussed in three different provisions of the 
Montana Code Annotated. In Title 82, Minerals, Oil, and Gas, minerals 
include any: 
 
ore, rock, or substance, other than oil, gas, bentonite, clay, coal, 
sand, gravel, peat, soil materials, or uranium, that is taken from 
below the surface or from the surface of the earth for the purpose 
of milling, concentration, refinement, smelting, manufacturing, or 
other subsequent use or processing or for stockpiling for future 
use, refinement, or smelting.57  
 
This definition provides little guidance to the question presented because 
fossils are not used in milling, concentration, refinement, smelting or any 
other defined form of processing.  
 
Additionally, under Title 70, Property, mineral means “gas; oil; 
coal; other gaseous, liquid, and solid hydrocarbons; oil shale; cement 
material; sand and gravel; road material; building stone; chemical raw 
material; gemstone; fissionable and nonfissionable ores; colloidal and 
other clay; steam and other geothermal resource.”58 Just as in Title 82 
this definition does not include any reference to fossils or any text that 
would necessarily encompass fossils.  
 
Finally, in Title 15, Taxation, mineral is defined as “any precious 
stones or gems, gold, silver, copper, coal, lead, petroleum, natural gas, 
oil, uranium, talc, vermiculite, limestone, or other nonrenewable 
merchantable products extracted from the surface or subsurface of the 
state of Montana.”59 This provision specifically distinguishes precious 
substances that have value as minerals, but does not include any 
reference to fossils. The Court has found little value in statutory 
interpretations of a mineral and in Farley it stated that “the definition of 
‘mineral’ can differ according to the context in which it is used.”60 Here, 
the Court should follow their decision in Farley and not rely on statutory 
definitions to resolve this matter.61 
 
While an equitable solution would include the Fossils in the mineral 
estate of the Ranch, since both parties have a portion of the mineral 
rights, the Court may choose to allow the will of the Montana State 
Legislature to dictate the outcome of this matter. In 2019, the Montana 
State Legislature passed House Bill 229, which specifically states that 
fossils are not minerals and are part of the surface estate of land.62 
Section 8 of House Bill 229 states that the act and its provisions within 
 
56 Farley v. Booth Brothers Land and Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 379 (Mont. 1995). 
57 MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-303 (2019).  
58 Id. § 70-9-802. 
59 Id. § 15-38-103.  
60 Farley, 890 P.2d at 379. 
61 Id. 
62 H.B. 229, 66th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2019). 
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apply retroactively to instruments that sever the mineral estate from the 
surface estate of a parcel of property.63 However, Section 5, carved out 
this matter from its application. Section 5 states that H.B. 229 does not 
affect proceedings that began before its passage.64 Since H.B. 229 cannot 
dictate the outcome of this matter by virtue of its passage, the Murrays 
request that the Court at least consider the message communicated by its 
passage.65 This request, however, would obscure the separation of 
powers afforded to both the judicial and legislative branches inMontana. 
While H.B. 229, will determine the outcome of future fossil disputes, the 
Court has the authority to determine the fate of the Fossils discovered on 
the Ranch. 
 
Since current statutory definitions and the newly enacted statute do 
not conclusively resolve the issue here, the Court will likely look to its 
prior holdings in Farley and Hart. In Farley, the Court determined that 
scoria could not easily be included in the statutory definition of 
“mineral” under Title 82.66 In its holding, the Court discussed how scoria 
is used for building roadways and the gains value after being processed.67 
Even though its rare and exceptional value was asserted by one of the 
parties in Farley, the Court did not rest its holding on that assertation.68 
Instead, the Court only noted that scoria is only useful for building and 
road-making purposes and therefore is not a mineral.69 This denotation is 
particularly important to the dispute between the Murrays and the 
Seversons because the Court in Farley focused its analysis on the 
production and processing potential of scoria not on its intrinsic value.  
 
The only other instance where the Court addressed the definition of 
a mineral was in Hart. In Hart, the Court briefly addressed the intrinsic 
value of the material in question and concluded that sandstone was not 
exceptionally rare or valuable.70 In Hart, the Court again turned to 
Heinatz in assessing whether sandstone constitutes a mineral with 
regards to a mineral rights reservation.71 The Court concluded that 
sandstone is not rare and has no exceptional value when used for 
landscaping purposes.72 As with Farley, the Court here focused on the 
production and processing value of the material in question and did not 
discuss its stand-alone intrinsic value. Accordingly, in this matter the 
Court is faced with a new issue that may fall outside the scope of Farley 
and Hart.  
 
Although the precise issue presented here has not previously been 
considered, the Court should extend the well-reasoned logic of Farley 
and Hart to resolve this case. First, the Court should look to see if the 
 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Appellee Br., supra note 47, at *35. 
66 Farley, 890 P.2d at 379.  
67 Id. at 380. 
68 Farley, 890 P.2d at 380 (quoting Holland v. Dolese Co., 540 P.2d 549, 550–51 (Okla. 1975)). 
69 Id. 
70 Hart v. Craig, 216 P.3d 197, 198 (Mont. 2009). 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
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Fossils are rare and exceptional in character. If the Court finds that the 
Fossils are rare and exceptional in character than they should be 
considered part of the mineral estate. However, if the Court does not find 
them to be rare and exceptional in character the Court should then see if 
they possess any peculiar property giving them special value for a 
production or processing purpose. Here, the Court should not have to go 
beyond the first part of the test. The Fossils discovered on the Ranch are 
not useful for road construction or other production purposes, but they 
are still rare and exceptional on their own as evidenced by their market 
value. The Court is likely to rule in contradiction of Montana Code 
Annotated § 1-4-112 in this matter and find that the Fossils in question 




Despite all prior case law discussing the processing value of various 
mineral substances, the Court will likely look to its established precedent 
and determine that the Fossils on the Ranch are part of the mineral estate. 
While this ruling will not impact other future fossil discoveries due to 
subsequent legislative enactments, it will have significant monetary 
effects on the Murrays and the Seversons. The Court will likely hold that 
the Fossils are rare and exceptional in character because they are 
distinguishable from the materials discussed in Farley and Hart and 
therefore should be categorized as minerals.  
